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<http://www.ifra-nigeria.org/IMG/pdf/violence-related-deaths-gombe-jigawa-state-nigeria.pdf>

A Study of Violence-Related Deaths
in Nafada Local Government Area of
Gombe State

and Auyo, Gagarawa, Gumel, Gwiwa,
Kaugama and Yankwasi Local
Government Areas of Jigawa State
(2006-2014)



The 'Invisible Violence' Project

Based in the premises of the French Institute for Research in Africa on the campus of the University of Ibadan, Nigeria Watch is a database project that has monitored fatal incidents and human security in Nigeria since 1 June 2006. The database compiles violent deaths on a daily basis, including fatalities resulting from accidents. It relies on a thorough reading of the Nigerian press (15 dailies & weeklies) and reports from human rights organisations. The two main objectives are to identify dangerous areas and assess the evolution of violence in the country.

However, violence is not always reported by the media, especially in remote rural areas that are difficult to access. Hence, in the last 8 years, Nigeria Watch has not recorded any report of fatal incidents in some of the 774 Local Government Areas (LGAs) of the Nigerian Federation. There are two possibilities: either these places were very peaceful, or they were not covered by the media. This series of surveys thus investigates 'invisible' violence.

By 1 November 2014, there were still 23 LGAs with no report of fatal incidents in the Nigeria Watch database: Udung Uko and Urue-Offong/Oruko (Akwa Ibom), Kwaya Kusar (Borno), Nafada (Gombe), Auyo, Gagarawa, Kaugama and Yankwashi (Jigawa), Ingawa and Matazu (Katsina), Sakaba (Kebbi), Bassa, Igalamela-Odolu and Mopa-Muro (Kogi), Toto (Nassarawa), Ifedayo (Osun), Gudu and Gwadabaw (Sokoto), Ussa (Taraba), and Karasuwa, Machina, Nguru and Yunusari (Yobe).

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MAKAI Daniel*

A Study of Violence-Related Deaths in Nafada Local Government Area of Gombe State and Auyo, Gagarawa, Gumel, Gwiwa, Kaugama and Yankwasi Local Government Areas of Jigawa State (2006-2014)
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Executive summary

Invisible violence exists in some rural areas in northern Nigeria. ‘Invisible’ here entails lack of available documented instances of fatal violence in such areas. Against this backdrop, the lack of data has prompted this study to unearth, document, and evaluate any occurrences of lethal violence in selected Local Government Areas (LGAs) in Gombe and Jigawa states from 2006 to 2014. The specific objectives are to:

- Assess and document invisible violence in Gombe and Jigawa states.
- Evaluate the categories of lethal violence that have occurred.
- Document the series of lethal violence incidents through terrorism, ethno-religious conflicts, land disputes, inter- and intra-group and political conflicts.

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The field research gathered evidence of the drivers of invisible violence in northern Nigeria through desktop review of secondary materials such as media reports, databases, policy reports, and academic literature, combined with primary research involving the conduct of key informant interviews, administration of questionnaires, and focus group discussions (FGDs).

According to the findings, the lack of data on fatal incidents in the focal communities results from the minimal occurrence of such violent activities. Yet economic (poverty and unemployment) as well as socio-cultural factors (poor parental upbringing or neglect of children) underpin young people's vulnerability to recruitment into violent activities by extremist groups or gangs. The high unemployment environment has caused youth involvement in the achaba (motor bike) business, leading to over-speeding and road traffic accidents. The study also found that the excesses of the security forces are not a major factor in youth involvement in violent activities, contrary to the popular assumption in some quarters.

BACKGROUND

The return to democracy in Nigeria in May 1999 brought hopes of rapid development and political stability. However, violent conflicts and criminality have undermined those expectations. Groups such as the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), the O’Odua People’s Congress (OPC), the Bakassi Boys, and the Movement for the Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) have proliferated. In particular, Boko Haram has leveraged the vulnerability of Nigerian youth to drive for recruitment and radicalisation. Many believe that the sympathisers of the group are mostly disaffected and unemployed youths who live in hostile environments with many challenges, including economic, social, and political deprivations. However, the rising activities of insurgent groups in the North-East have generated interest in other quarters of the region that show little or no data on violence. The specific objectives of the study are to:

- Provide an empirical understanding and assessment of invisible violence in Nafada in Gombe State and Auyo, Gumel, Gwiwa, Gagarawa, Kaugama, and Yankwasi in Jigawa State.
- Document the series of lethal violence incidents, if any, in the aforementioned focal communities from 2006 to 2014.

METHODOLOGY

In the course of this research, a vast array of sources was consulted in crosschecking the rate of invisible violence in Nafada LGA of Gombe State and Auyo, Gagarawa, Gumel, Gwiwa, Kaugama, and

Yankwasi LGAs of Jigawa State. In-depth interviews sourced first-hand information from 10–20 key stakeholders—community leaders, members of the security forces, youth leaders, religious leaders—from each of the focal Local Government Areas (LGAs). The interviews were mainly conducted in Hausa and were then transcribed and analysed in English.

Three instruments were used to obtain data for this study. The main instrument was a questionnaire that sought to identify aspects of the socio-cultural, political, and religious orientation of young people and the incidences of lethal violence in the studied LGAs. Specifically, it covered young people's cultural beliefs and practices *vis-à-vis* their society, parents, vulnerability to violence, factors giving rise to religious violence, sources of radicalising information, and so on. The questionnaire also contained several open-ended options for respondents to freely express their opinions. Qualitative data was generated through FGDs and key informant interviews. A total of 135 participants were selected and administered with the questionnaire through a convenient sampling technique in seven major towns of Gombe and Jigawa states in October 2014: 20 questionnaires were administered in Nafada LGA of Gombe State, and 115 in Auyo, Gagarawa, Gumel, Gwiwa, Kaugama, and Yankwasi LGAs of Jigawa State. The participants included teachers, security agents, youths, community and religious leaders, civil society organizations, and women. In view of the volatile security nature of the state, participants were identified purposively, with willingness to participate the most important criterion. Since many of those who volunteered were illiterate, some of the questionnaires were completed by the researcher. Three research assistants (one each in Nafada, Gwiwa, and Yankwasi) were trained on the questionnaire administration and helped the researcher to collect data. Five FGDs were held in Jigawa State (two each for youth and religious groups, and one for the security group). One FGD was held in Nafada at the

Hakimi’s palace for some of his cabinet and security guards. Eighteen key informant interviews were held (three in Nafada and 15 in Jigawa) with participants from a wide range of backgrounds, including traditional, religious, women’s, and political leaders, as well as with security officials. The collected data were analysed through the use of percentages, totals, and charts.




Figure 1 - Selected LGAs in Gombe and Jigawa: Do you consider your neighbourhood to be violent?
 Source: fieldwork, 135 individual questionnaires. Only 6 answered “Yes”.




Figure 2 - Selected LGAs in Gombe and Jigawa: Are you aware of any violent event in your Local Government Area during the last 10 years?

Source: fieldwork, 135 individual questionnaires. 44 answered "Yes".




Figure 3 - Selected LGAs in Gombe and Jigawa: Which year do you think the violence occurred?

Source: fieldwork, 135 individual questionnaires. In Gwiwa, the only respondent aware of a fatal incident during the past ten years was not able to remember its date. In Yankwasi, the two respondents who mentioned some violent events could not give any details about them.




Figure 4 - Selected LGAs in Gombe and Jigawa: Security personnel present during fatal incidents according to the number of respondents.

Source: fieldwork, 135 individual questionnaires. There was no mention of any intervention of the security forces in Gwiwa, Auyo, and Yankwasi LGAs.




Figure 5 - Causes of fatal violence according to the number of respondents

Source: fieldwork, 135 individual questionnaires. There was no mention of Auyo and Yankwasi LGAs.

INVISIBLE VIOLENCE IN GOMBE: THE CAS OF NAFADA LGA

Gombe State was formed from the then Bauchi State in 1996, with Gombe town as the capital. It shares a boundary with all the other five states in the North-East geopolitical zone, namely Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Taraba, and Yobe. The state consists of 11 LGAs and 114 wards. The local government areas are Akko, Balanga, Billiri, Dukku, Funakaye, Gombe, Kaltungo, Kwami, Nafada, Shongom, and Yamaltu/Deba. When the population census was conducted in 2006, the state's population figures stood at 2,353,000. Major tribes in the state include Waja, Tangale, Tera, Fulani, Bolewa, Kanuri, Jukun, Cham, Tula, Pero/Shonge, and Kamo/Awak. However, the Hausa language is widely spoken all over the state. Although Gombe has 11 LGAs, only its capital city can be considered truly urban. The headquarters of other LGAs are mainly semi-urban, with lower populations and development. Gombe town is the administrative and commercial capital of the state. In fact,

long before the state was created, Gombe was seen as more of a commercial and trading centre, especially with Kwara and Kano states. Moreover, the unique location of Gombe town at the centre of the North-East has made it a resting and meeting point for travellers and traders from different parts of the geo-political zone and beyond.

The people of Gombe State are not only commercially oriented, but also large-scale farmers, especially of beans, maize, rice, sorghum, bambara nut, groundnut, and sesame, which are basic raw materials in high demand by industries within and outside the state. Indeed, agriculture engages about 80 per cent of Gombe's active population. Gombe State originated from the fusion of two distinct large groups: the Gombe Emirate in the north and the ethnic grouping in the south known as Tangale-Waja. Gombe emerged as part of a larger state-building force of the nineteenth century Sokoto jihad under the leadership of Buba Yero, who was among the 11 people given flags by Usman Dan Fodio to propagate Islam. It had its original headquarters at Gombe Abba, until the advent of the British in the twentieth century, who began to administer the area under two Native Authorities: Gombe and Tangale-Waja. Looking at the rich historical, agricultural, and commercial significance of Gombe State, there is little wonder then that it continues to attract a wide range of people from far and near, as not only visitors pursuing one interest or another, but also settlers who have found its atmosphere very congenial.

Since its creation in 1996, Gombe State never experienced any major eruption of violence, despite the fact that almost all the neighbouring states were embroiled in various crises, until 17 April 2011, when post-presidential election riots broke out in Gombe town with youths taking the lead in the mayhem. Although the attacks began as politically motivated incidents, with CPC youths taking the lead in attacking the INEC office and the houses of people known to be members of the ruling

People's Democratic Party (PDP), events took a different turn later in the day as churches and the houses of Christians became the new targets. This led to the spread of the upheaval to many parts of the state capital, and it took security forces two days to bring the situation under control.

However, the research's main focus in Gombe State was Nafada LGA, which has little or no record of violence. With its headquarters in Nafada on the Gongola River, the LGA has an area of 1,586 sq km and a population of 138,185 according to the 2006 census. Nafada has ten wards: Barwo/Nasarawo, Birin Bolewa, Birin Fulani West, Jigawa, Nafada East, Barwo Winde, Birin Fulani East, Gudukku, Nafada Central, and Nafada West.

The fatalities the researcher discovered in Nafada LGA numbered 18, with one event leading to many more deaths whose number could not be ascertained. A breakdown of some of the events is listed below:

- In the year 2000 (i.e. before the period covered by this study), a village crisis occurred in a place called Udawa between Fulani people and cattle grazers, causing an indeterminate number of fatalities.
- In May 2007, an accident between a car and a bike in Kasuwan Ngalda led to one man's death.
- In May 2009, a man suspected to be a witch was caught and beaten to death.
- On 22 May 2013, a trailer collided with a car between Dabar Fulani and Kurugu, killing three people.
- In August 2013, two deaths resulted from a violent clash between the Kalaye people and the Mada over loaned farmlands.

- In August 2013, a boundary dispute between Yobe and Nafada LGA ended in the loss of three people's lives.
- In February 2014, a clash between the People's Democratic Party (PDP) and All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) as both parties sought to install their party flags in Nafada town caused two deaths.
- In April 2014, a car accident in Nafada town resulted in one person's death.
- On 2 August 2014, at the entrance into Nafada town a head-on collision between a bike and a car killed two people instantly.
- On 10 August 2014, a car accident in Nafada town caused one death.

INVISIBLE VIOLENCE IN JIGAWA: THE CASE OF AUYO, GWIWA, GAGARAWA, GUMEL, KUAGAMA, AND YANKWASI LGAS

Jigawa State is one of the 36 states that constitute the Federal Republic of Nigeria. Jigawa is also one of the six states that make up Nigeria's North-West geo-political zone. It shares an international border with the Republic of Niger to the north and the Nigerian states of Yobe to the northeast, Katsina to the northwest, Bauchi to the southeast, and Kano to the southwest. Dutse is the state capital. To the north, Jigawa shares an international border with Zinder Region in the Republic of Niger, which is a unique opportunity for cross-border trading activities. The government readily took advantage of this by initiating and establishing a free-trade zone at the border town of Maigatari.

The first settlers of Jigawa State were the Hausa people. According to oral tradition, the settlers were migrants from the Borno city of Baghirmi. The dominant ethnic groups in Jigawa are the Hausas and the Fulani. There are four major languages spoken in the state: Bade,

Hausa, Kanuri, and Warji. Over 90 per cent of the population of Jigawa are Muslims and there are few Christians. The state contains 27 LGAs and each has a chairman at its administrative head. There are five emirate councils: Hadejia, Kazaure, Ringim, Dutse, and Gumel.

Most of the respondents considered that Jigawa is one of the most peaceful states in Nigeria. This is essentially because the majority of its inhabitants share the same culture and religion: they practise Islam, enjoy freedom of worship, and are used to exchanging pleasantries with each other. Another reason that can be posited for peaceful coexistence in Jigawa is that police intervention is clearly less lethal than army intervention, as can be seen in Figure 4.

The case of Auyo LGA

Auyo is one of the eight local governments that make up the Jigawa East Senatorial District. Comprising the two districts of Auyo and Ayama, it has ten wards: Auyakayi, Auyo, Ayama, Ayan, Gamafoi, Gamsarka, Gatafa, Kafur, Tsidir, and Unik. Headquartered in the town of Auyo, the LGA was formed by the administration of General Sani Abacha in 1996 from Hadejia and Kafin Hausa LGAs. It is bordered on the north by Hadejia, Kiri-Kasama, and Malam-Madori LGAs, on the west by Kaugama and Miga, on the south by Kafin Hausa, and on the east by Bauchi State.

Auyo has an area of 536 sq km and a population of 132,001 according to the 2006 census. Dominant ethnic groups are Hausa and Fulani, who are all predominantly Muslims. The Auyokawa language, now extinct, was formerly spoken in the area. Situated in the north-eastern part of Jigawa State along the Hadejia River, the terrain is generally composed of Sudan savannah. It has the potential for both rainfall and

irrigation farming, with a rainy season from May to September and a dry season from October to April. Temperatures of about 40° C are common, especially in the months of March to September, but can be as low as 11° C during the Harmattan season. Meteorological data in the Jigawa State statistical yearbook indicates that annual rainfall is normally between 600 and 1000 mm, with an average of about 650 mm.

Endowed with fertile agricultural land, grazing reserves, and some forestry, the LGA is predominately rural with less than 10 per cent of the population residing in towns such as Auyo and Ayama. In general, the average household size is 6–7 people, usually male-headed. Agriculture is the dominant economic activity, providing about 85 per cent of employment. Crops produced include rice, millet, cowpea, guinea corn, groundnut, and sesame. The LGA is also blessed with mineral resources such as kaolin and limestone.

Both the *Hakimi* (traditional head) and Divisional Police Officer (DPO) reported that Auyo LGA has not witnessed any violent incidents resulting in deaths. They attested to the fact that they are peace loving and welcoming people. The only evidence of violence was from two respondents who reported the collapse of houses and the death of animals during flooding in September 2006 and July 2011.

The case of Gwiwa LGA

Created in 1991, Gwiwa was carved out from Roni Local Government by the then military regime of General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida. With an area of 473 sq km and a population of 128,730 according to the 2006 census, it is bordered by Roni LGA in the south, Yankwashi in the east, and Katsina State in the north and west. The LGA is rural and comprises two districts: Gwiwa and Rorau. It also has 11 wards: Buntusu, Dabi, Darina, Fuskar Yamma, Guntai, Gwiwa, Korayel, Rorau,

Shafe, Yola, and Zaumar Sainawa, including 77 polling units. Each district is headed by a traditional chief, named *Chiroman Kazaure* in Gwiwa and *Marafan Kazaure* in Rorau. These chiefs, who are currently Alhaji Bello Adamu and Alhaji Ja'afaru Badakaya, live respectively in Gwiwa and Korayel.

The area is blessed with rich arable land conducive to extensive farming, both for local consumption and export to various parts of the country. As in Auyo, there has been no report of violent activities. The only fatalities recorded by the Inspector of Gwiwa Divisional Police Headquarters was a traffic accident between Daura and Kazaure road from Firji to Sada that led to the death of 11 people in May 2013. The accident was a head-on collision between two vehicles as a result of over-speeding and lack of attention while driving.

The case of Gagarawa LGA

Created in 1991, Gagarawa LGA has an area of 685 sq km and a population of 82,153 according to the 2006 census. Headquartered in the town of Gagarawa, it is bordered by Taura and Garki LGAs in the south, Sule Tankarkar in the west, Gumel and Maigatari in the north, and Kaugama in the east. The LGA has 10 wards: Gagarawa Gari, Gagarawa Tasha, Garin Chiroma, Kore Balatu, Madaka, Maiaduwa, Maikilili, Medu, Yalawa, and Zarada.

In Gagarawa LGA, there were only two records of fatal violence. In April 2012, a car coming down a hill rolled over and caused one person's death. In May 2014, a conflict arose when a Fulani herdsman took his cattle to graze over a farmer's land in Baraye. The use of machetes was involved and the Fulani man was eventually killed.

The case of Gumel LGA

Situated in the northern part of Jigawa State near the border of the Republic of Niger, Gumel (also spelled Gummel) LGA is a traditional emirate founded about 1750 by Dan Juma of Kano city and his followers of the Mangawa tribe. Shortly after Dan Juma's death in 1754, Gumel became a tributary state of the Bornu kingdom. In 1845, its capital was moved from Tumbi, in present-day Republic of Niger, to its current site, 20 miles south. The emirate survived the Fulani attacks of Usman dan Fodio's jihad in the early nineteenth century and never became part of the Fulani Empire of Sokoto. But from 1828 onwards, it was plagued by wars with nearby Hadejia, Kano, and Zinder (formerly Damagaram). The fight with Hadejia, for example, continued until Gumel's emir, Abdullahi, was killed in battle in 1872. Slave raids toward the end of the century by Damagaram also depopulated the area. In 1903, Emir Ahmadu then submitted to the British and the region was incorporated into Kano province.

After independence, Gumel became part of Kano State in 1976 and its successor, Jigawa State, in 1991. With an area of 234 sq km and a population of 106,371 according to the 2006 census, the LGA now has 11 wards: Baikarya, Danama, Dantanoma, Galagamma, Garin Alhaji Barka, Garin Gambo, Gusau, Hammado, Kofar Arewa, Kofar Yamma, and Zango. Situated on a secondary highway linking it to Kano and Hadejia, its headquarters remains the chief market centre and serves as a collecting point for groundnuts, which are trucked to Kano city for export by rail. The town of Gumel also has a farm-training centre and an advanced teacher-training college, while limestone and diatomaceous earth are exploited in scattered areas.

In Gumel LGA, respondents recalled four deaths due to violence. These fatalities resulted from a crisis

between two communities, Sabon Layi and Abuja, which led to the burning of Gumel police station in July 2007. A car accident involving a J5 Peugeot in May 2007 also caused two deaths.

The case of Kaugama LGA

Created in 1991, Kaugama LGA has an area of 925 sq km and a population of 128,981 according to the 2006 census. The LGA has 11 wards: Arbus, Askandu, Dabuwaran, Dakaiyawa, Hadin, Ja'e, Jarkasa, Kaugama, Marke, Unguwar Jibrin, and Yalo. Headquartered in the town of Kaugama, it has a reputation for being a peaceful place. The only fatal incidents recalled were a car accident that killed one person in May 2008, and a clash between Birnin Kudu and Kaugama football clubs in a match competition that resulted in two deaths.

The case of Yankwashi LGA

Yankwashi LGA was carved out from Kazaure Local Government on 5 December 1996. With an area of 390 sq km, it consists of two district councils, Karkarna and Achilafiya. It is bordered on the south and east by Kazaure LGA, on the west by Gwiwa, and on the north by Katsina State. The LGA has 17 village heads, 12 in Karkarna District and five in Achilafiya District. It consists of ten wards: Achilafiya, Zungumba, Belas, Kuda, Karkarna, Gwarta, Gurjiya, Dawan Gawo, Ringim, and Yankwashi. The LGA has a population of 95,643, according to the 2006 census. The inhabitants are mainly Fulani cattle breeders and Hausa farmers who live in the villages of Karkarna Arewa, Karkarna Kudu, Ringim, Yankwashi, Sabuwa, Kwarin-Kargo, Jeka-Fada, Dankama, Dawan-Gawo, Gwarta, Rauda, Kuda, Birji, Achilafiya, Sada, Zungumba, and Dankari.

According to respondents, Yankwasi LGA recorded no violence in all the areas of inquiry. The *Hakimi* and his secretary noted only an incident on 17 July 2012 between a farmer and a Fulani herdsman who took his cattle to graze over the farmer's land, though there was no death recorded.

LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY

Conducting research on security in an area as volatile as north-eastern Nigeria is not an easy task; hence a few issues that may impact on data quality need to be borne in mind. First, in spite of the simple selection procedure adopted, many respondents were uncomfortable with the interviews—especially Muslims, the few available Christians, and security agents who in some cases declined to be interviewed for fear of victimization (many Christians have in the past been targets of the Boko Haram insurgency). Second, the sample size of 135 people used may not be adequately representative of the state's population.

And third, the fact that FGDs could not be held in all LGAs may be a weakness in the qualitative data generated. That no tape recorder was used could also introduce some bias but is in line with Loimeier's view that interviewees are more forthcoming in a less formal atmosphere (Loimeier 1997). This research did not focus on members of any radical group or their targets but on what a broad spectrum of the citizens of Gombe and Jigawa states perceived about invisible violence: whether it occurred and was not documented. At best, this may be called a perception study of invisible or objective violence. While these issues may impact on data quality, the information gathered overall provides a 'ground-breaking' assessment of invisible violence in the states visited at this time.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

After a careful and thorough analysis of the data collected, the following are the major findings obtained in the LGAs under review in Gombe and Jigawa States:

In Auyo 12 respondents were unaware of any violent event in the last ten years, as against the two who said “Yes” to having witnessed some violence. Therefore, we can safely deduce from this analysis that the actual absence of lethal violence in Auyo LGA resulted in an absence of recorded deaths. In Gagarawa, 17 respondents attested to the fact that no incidence of violence occurred in the last ten years, while six gave cognizance of violent events during the last decade. The conclusion drawn from this analysis is that there was indeed no lethal violence in Gagarawa during the period under review. In Gwiwa, one respondent recognized a violent event during the past ten years, while 23 said there were no such cases. So, it is apparent that there were no fatal incidents in Gwiwa during the period under study. The same goes for Yankwasi, where only two of 20 respondents said they had witnessed cases of violence in the last ten years.

However, in Kaugama six respondents considered their LGA to be violence-prone, while four could not attest to that in the last decade. In Gumel, 15 respondents said that their society was violent, as opposed to seven who reasoned otherwise. In Nafada, finally, 12 of twenty respondents were aware of violent events. In the three LGAs of Kaugama, Gumel, and Nafada, we can conclude that the absence of reported fatalities was caused by the shortcomings of the national press in the gathering of data, and not by the lack of violence.

The reason for this is the difficult access to rural areas. Most press workers are located in the state capital, and the indigenous dwellers may not consider such

incidents worthy of publication. The Hausa people, especially the uneducated, often consider such incidents as acts of God that need no publication.

CONCLUSION

Invisible violence is a concept that connotes the shortcomings in the gathering of data or an actual absence of lethality in a given society. In this study, 135 questionnaires were administered. A total of 91 respondents (67.4 per cent) attested to the fact that there had been no lethal conflicts or accidents in their respective LGAs, while 44 respondents (32.6 per cent) considered their LGAs to be violence-prone, yet with few fatalities. To sum up, the absence of reported violent deaths resulted both from shortcomings in the gathering of data and, in some cases, the actual absence of lethality in these rural societies.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ANPP	-	All Nigeria People's Party
CPC	-	Congress for Progressive
Change		
DPO	-	Divisional Police Officer
FC	-	Football Club
FGD	-	Focus Group Discussion
FRSC	-	Federal Road Safety
Commission		
INEC	-	Independent National
Electoral Commission		
LGA	-	Local Government Area
MASSOB	-	Movement for the
Actualization of the Sovereign State of Biafra		
MEND	-	Movement for the
Emancipation of the Niger Delta		
NAN	-	News Agency of Nigeria
OPC	-	O'Odia People's Congress
PDP	-	People's Democratic Party

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